Abstract. Large weak key classes of IDEA are found for which membership is tested with a differential-linear test while encrypting with a single key. In particular, one in every 2'' keys for 8.5-round IDEA is weak. A related-key differential-linear attack on 4-round IDEA is presented which is successful for all keys. Large weak key classes are found for 4.5-to 6.5-round and 8-round IDEA for which membership of these classes is tested using similar related-key differential-linear tests.
Introduction
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [14] is a 64-bit block cipher using a 128-bit key. IDEA consists of eight rounds of encryption (referred to as f i l l rounds) followed by an output transformation. For this reason IDEA is said to be an 8.5-round cipher, and on occasion when the output transformation is omitted for the sake of analysis, we refer to the cipher as 8-round IDEA. Further, when the number of rounds is reduced to say 4 rounds, the resulting cipher is referred to as 4.5-round and 4-round IDEA depending on whether the output transformation is included or not.
The full 8.5-round version of IDEA is considered to be practically secure against differential cryptanalysis [2, 141 (see [13, 17, 12, 5] ), linear cryptanalysis [16] (see [9] ) and various generalizations of linear cryptanalysis (see [8, lo] ). A related-key attack on 8.5-round IDEA has been proposed [ll] , although this attack utilized a weakness in the implementation rather than the algorithm. Successful attacks exist against IDEA with a reduced number of rounds. These attacks include: differential attacks against 2.5-round IDEA [17, 6] ; a differentiallinear cryptanalysis [4, 51 against 3-round IDEA; and a truncated differential attack against 3.5-round IDEA [12, 51. The results obtained in this paper are extensions of the two following attacks.
A weak key class is a set of session keys for which membership can be determined with a relatively small workload. Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle [7] found two weak key classes of 8.5-round IDEA. In the first weak key class, consisting of zz3 session keys, membership is tested by confirming that a certain linear approximation holds with probability one, while in the second weak key class, consisting of 2 ' l session keys, membership is tested by confirming that R Size (log,) Av. Data Comp. a certain differential approximation holds with probability one. This work is extended in this paper by finding weak key classes for which membership is tested by confirming that a differential-linear approximation holds with probability one. These weak key classes are significantly larger than those found in [7] .
In particular, the full 8.5-round IDEA has a weak key class containing 263 session keys. Testing membership of this weak key class requires an average of 19. 5 plaintexts. If the session key is weak, then the membership test recovers 72 bits of the session key.
In a related-key attack [l, 111 the attacker obtains the encryption of certain plaintext not only under the original session key K, which is unknown, but also under some other associated session keys K' = f(K). Kelsey, Schneier and Wagner [ll] found a related-key attack on 3.5-round IDEA using six chosen plaintexts encrypted under two related-keys. In this paper we extend this attack to a related-key differential-linear attack on 4-round IDEA which recovers 15 bits of information about the session key using an average of 38.3 chosen plaintexts encrypted under two related-keys. This is the first known attack on 4-round IDEA which is successful for all session keys. Every session key of the 4-round version of IDEA is susceptible to a related-key differential-linear attack. The attack is based on a related-key differential-linear approximation which holds with probability one for all session keys. A similar approach is used to detect membership of large weak key classes of IDEA with more rounds.
No feasible attacks have been proposed to attack IDEA with more than 3.5-rounds, so we focus our attention on IDEA with 4 or more rounds. Using the two methods above, we determine the largest known weak key classes of R-round and R.5-round IDEA, 4 5 R 5 8 . Table 1 provides a summary of the size of the weak key classes and the data complexity of the corresponding membership tests. Note that all session keys are weak keys for the related-key differential-linear attack on 4-round IDEA. Membership of the weak key classes of IDEA with between 4.5 and 6.5 rounds is tested by confirming that a related-key differential-linear approximation holds with probability one, as is membership of the weak key class of 8-round IDEA. Membership of the the remaining weak key classes is tested by confirming that a differential-linear approximation holds with probability one while encrypting with a single key. We begin introducing notation in $2. In §3 we construct differential-linear approximations which hold with probability one for a subset of the session keys.
Weak key classes of R-round and R.5-round IDEA, 4 5 R 5 8, are determined for which there is a differential-linear approximation of probability one. In 53.1 we describe an attack for testing membership of these weak key classes. In §4 we describe attacks which exploit related-key differential-linear approximations of probability one. The encryption process and key schedule of IDEA, and some results of Daemen, Govaerts and Vandewalle [7] are given in the Appendix.
Notation
IDEA is constructed from three group operations acting on 16-bit subblocks.
These group operations are: bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR), denoted by @; addition modulo 216, denoted by ffl ; and multiplication modulo 216+ 1 with the subblock 0 . . .O EE 216, denoted by 0. The computation graph of the encryption process of IDEA is shown in Figure 2 in the Appendix. The full round function of IDEA consists of two "layers". The first layer is called the k e y combining stage, while the second layer contains the multiplication-addition (MA) structure. The 16-bit subkeys are determined from the session key as shown in Table 5 , in the Appendix. Due to the subblock nature of the cipher, the input to the r-th round (and the output of the ( T -1)-st round) is denoted C(') = C~' C~' C~) C~) . Linear approximations between the input and output of the r-th round are represented by a(') . C(') + a(++') . C('+l) = 7 ' , where a('), a('+') E z64 2 ,'Yr E (0, l} and a(') . C(') = xfzo a(')[i]C(')[i] (mod 2) is the binary inner product.
The value a(') is known as the mask for C(+). Note that in any linear relation in this paper, addition is assumed to be modulo two. Due to the subblock nature of the cipher we often write masks for linear approximations in terms of subblocks, e.g. a(') = (ar), a;), a!), at'). All differences in this paper are of the form A A = A @ A * , and we denote the 16-bit difference 10.. . O = 215 by Y. Differences for differential characteristics are also written in terms of subblocks, e.g. 6") = [6p), b t ) , 6!), 6!)]. Round brackets ( ) are used for masks, to distinguish these values from differences which use square brackets [ 1.
Constructing Differential-Linear Approximations of Probability One
A differential-linear approximation (DL-approximation) is denoted by a triple (6, a, E ) where 6, a E z; \ (0) and E E (0, l}, and the DL-approximation predicts that there exist plaintext pairs P, P* such that PIK] @ a ' dK]* = E . The probability of the DL-approximation is defined a8 = 6 and a . CLK] + pr((y. c[KJ + (y . c[KJ* = I P I P[KJ* = 6).
A dzfleerential-hear weak (DL-weak) key class W is a set of session keys for which some associated DL-approximation (6, a, E ) holds with probability one. The one-round differential and linear approximations given in the Appendix can be used to construct DL-approximations (6, a, t) which hold with probability one for large DL-weak key classes, as shown in the following example. Figure 1 shows how this DL-approximation is constructed. O,v , v] with probability one, due to the structure of IDEA. If K E W then the subkeys Zia), Z!'), Z i 3 ) , and 2p) are either zero or one. Consequently, each of the following characteristics holds with probability one, as the appropriate subkeys are either zero or one: ACi6) = v with probability one, due to the structure of the round function.
If K E W , then the subkeys Z i 6 ) , ZS", Zi7) and Z y ) are also either zero or one. Thus, following from the results in the Appendix, the one-round linear characteristics
hold with probability one. These one-round linear characteristics are concatenated to form the linear characteristic To test if a DL-approximation (6, a, c) holds with probability one, the attacker must guess enough information about the subkeys in the first round to obtain pairs P and P* for which APIK] = 6, and enough information about the subkeys in the last round to determine a .
from the corresponding ciphertexts C and C*. To determine if the DL-approximation holds with probability one, the attacker must obtain the encryptions of plaintext pairs P, P' holds with probability one. 
Testing Membership
Consider a DL-approximation (a, a, E ) for which the corresponding DL-weak key class W has b weak bit positions (so there are 2'z8-b DL-weak keys in this class).
Suppose that t l bits of a subkey in the first round and t z bits of a subkey in the last round are guessed. Let 2 and 2' be candidates for the values of the subkeys in the first and last rounds respectively. It can be shown that if C, C' is a DL-right pair for 2' then C, C' is also a DL-right pair for (0 @ 2'). If both values are candidates, then the attacker need only test one of these values. However, as 0 0 2' = F Q l 2 it follows that only one of 2 ' and 0 @ Z' has the LSB equal to zero. In Example 2, the 9 LSB's of , 7 1 9 ) are zero, and thus there is only one value of Z* and 0 @ Z* which is a candidate for the value of Zi9). However, if all 16 bits of a subkey in the last round are guessed, then the attacker needs only test one candidate out of Z' and 0 @ Z * . Thus, only 215 candidates Z' are tested, and we assume, for the purposes of calculating the data complexity, that tz = 15. Similarly, if C, C' is &pair for Z then C, C' is also a &pair for (0 @ 2). Thus, if tl = 16, we reduce this t o t l = 15. A candidate, for example 2, is said to be consistent with K if either Z or 0 @ Z is the correct value of the subkey in the first round, otherwise it is inconsistent.
If K 6 W and both candidates Z and 2' are consistent with K , then the triple (K, 2 , Z ' ) is said to be complete, otherwise it is incomplete. The aim of a differential-linear weak key (DL-weak key) membership test is to either find a complete triple ( K , Z , Z " ) ( 
Differential-Linear Weak Key Membership Test
Step 1. Let 2 be a candidate for the value of the subkey guessed in the first round.
Step 2. Conduct DL-tests on the triples ( K , Z , Z ' ) for every candidate Z' for the value of the subkey guessed in the last round until either every triple fails a DL-test, or a triple ( K , Z, Z') passes each of p DL-tests.
Step 3. If all triples using candidate Z fail a DL-test, then try another candidate for the value of the subkey guessed in the first round and return to Step 2.
Otherwise, the triple ( K , Z, Z ' ) which passed all p DL-tests is assumed to be complete, and K E W , and the subkey guessed in the first round (last round) is Table 2 . If K $ W , then all candidates Z must be tested. Therefore, a total of 2'1Et, plaintext pairs or 2t1+1E1, encryptions on average are required to show that each incomplete triple fails a DL-test, and *us K $ W . As most session keys are not DL-weak, this then is the average data complexity of the DL-weak key membership test. For example, the average data complexity of the membership test described in Example 3 is E7 = 9.74 pairs, which corresponds to
19.5 encryptions. The use of precomputed tables reduces the process complexity during a membership test to at most three table look-ups for each plaintext pair tested. Table 3 contains the details for the largest DL-weak key classes for Rround and R.5-round IDEA, 4 5 R 5 8. DL-weak key classes can also be found using the decryption key schedule. These DL-weak key classes have been found to offer no increase in size over the DL-weak key classes using the encryption key schedule. Table 3 . DL-weak key classes of R-round and R.5-round IDEA, 4 
Related-Key Differential-Linear Attacks
The membership tests presented in $3 are based on testing pairs of plaintexts which have been encrypted under the same session key. The membership tests presented in the current section are different in that the plaintext pairs P, P* are encrypted under two relaled-keys K and K' which differ in a certain bit position.
Otherwise, the concept is identical. The plaintext pairs are chosen to cancel out the differences in the subkeys in the first round, so that after a few rounds of encryption, some corresponding intermediate ciphertext subblocks are the same.
The attacker then tests if linear approximation between dK] and C[K']* holds
by guessing the value of a subkey in the last round. This approach is used to develop the first known attack on 4-round IDEA which is successful for all session keys. The attack is an extension of the relatedkey attack on 3.5-round IDEA found by Kelsey, Schneier and Wagner [ll] . Large weak key classes of IDEA with more than four rounds are found for which membership is checked using a similar technique. The membership tests are based on testing if related-key differential-linear approximations hold with probability one. A related-key diferential-linear approximation (RKDL-approzimation) is denoted by a triple (ka, a, E ) where 0 5 kn 5 127, cr E: zi \ (0) and E E (0, l}, and the RKDL-approximation predicts that there exist plaintext pairs P, P* such that = i"K']* and a . dK] + a . C[x']* = 0, where K and K' differ in bit position kA. Note that P is encrypted to C under K and P* is encrypted to C* under K'. The probability of the RKDL-approximation is defined as
where K' differs from K in bit position kA. A related-key differential-linear weak (RKDL-weak) key class W is a set of session keys for which some associated RKDL-approximation (La, a, E ) holds with probability one. In the following example we construct a RKDL-approximation for 4-round IDEA which holds with probability one for all session keys. Thus, all session keys are RKDL-weak keys of 4-round IDEA. ( ((c?) o z? )) (CP) ~p))) o zL3)'> Therefore, the RKDL-approximation (La, a , E ) = (16, ( 0 , 1 , 1 , 0 ) , 0) holds with probability one for all session keys. That is, all session keys are RKDL-weak keys.
0
RKDL-weak key classes of IDEA with more rounds contain session keys for which certain subkeys are either zero or one, so that appropriate linear approximations hold with probability one, as with DL-weak key classes. These RKDLweak key classes are exploited using a related-key diflerential-linear weak key (RKDL-weak key) membership test. As with a DL-weak key membership test, the aim of a RKDL-weak key membership test is to either find a complete triple bound p is determined as with a DL-weak key membership test. As the RKDLapproximation to $-round IDEA holds with probability one for all keys, a weak key bound does not apply. Table 4 contains details of RKDL-weak key classes of R-round and R.5-round IDEA, 4 5 R 5 6, and 8-round IDEA. The RKDLweak key class of 8-round IDEA corresponds to a RKDL-approximation to the decryption algorithm, rather than the encryption algorithm. The average data complexity is determined as with a DL-weak key membership test. Tables are computed beforehand, as with DL-weak key membership tests, to reduce the process complexity to at most three table look-ups for each plaintext pair tested.
Related-Key Differential-Linear Weak Key Attack
Step 1. Let Z be a candidate for the value of the subkey guessed in the first round.
Step 2. Conduct RKDL-tests on the triples ( K , Z , Z * ) for every candidate Z* for the value of the subkey guessed in the last round until either every triple fails a RKDL-test, or a triple ( K , Z, Z') passes each of p RKDL-tests.
Step 3. If all triples using candidate 2 fail a RKDL-test, then try another candidate for the value of the subkey guessed in the first round and return to Step 2. Otherwise, the triple ( K , Z, Z") which passed all p RKDL-tests is assumed to be complete, and K E W , and the subkey guessed in the first round 0 (last round) is either Z or 0 @ 2 (Z* or 0 @ 2 * ) . Table 4 . The largest RKDL-weak key classes for R-round and R.5-round IDEA, 4 5 R 5 6, and 8-round IDEA. Membership of the RKDL-weak key class of 8-round IDEA is tested using decryption, while the remaining RKDL-weak key classes are tested using encryption. The corresponding RKDL-approximations are of the form ( k A , a , e) where kd is given in the second column, a is given in the third column and E = 0.
Conclusion
New weak key classes have been found for IDEA which are significantly larger than those previously known. The linear key schedule and the choice of group operations contribute the size of these weak key classes. We note that if key distribution and exchange protocol allow, then the attacker can determine the bits in the weak bit positions of an unknown session key by altering these bits until the appropriate test indicates that the resulting session key is weak. We recommend that the key schedule of IDEA be altered so that IDEA has no weak keys, and key distribution and exchange protocol be analyzed to ensure that known weak key classes cannot be exploited.
